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Ask a friend to give an example of symmetry and she may very well cite the human body. Ask her then to say
what that means, to give a definition of symmetry, and she may find that a precise formulation does not come easily.
Ask, finally, that she capture in words the relationship—obvious similarity, subtle difference—between the left and
right hands of that symmetrical human figure—and, when she flounders, console her by reporting that Immanuel Kant
struggled with the same problem, in vain.
That little experiment offers a bare hint, a scratch (so to say) of the surface of the surface, of the issues surrounding
the history of the idea of symmetry as set out in this flawed but fascinating book. Giora Hon teaches at the University
of Haifa; his main current research interest (according to his website) is the “problem of experimental error”. Bernard
Goldstein, now at the University of Pittsburgh, is a well-known historian of ancient, medieval and early-modern
astronomy and astrology.
At the heart of their brave enterprise is a tricky dilemma. One can write a history of the concept of symmetry,
or one can write a history of the word “symmetry” (and its equivalents in other languages); and clearly these are
not the same thing, though of course they overlap considerably and an ambitious account could hope to do justice
to both. Hon and Goldstein adopt in this matter a policy which colours deeply their approach to their subject. They
are certainly concerned with concepts, as their book’s very title attests. Indeed they express (p. 9) the hope that their
work will contribute to our understanding of the “making” of concepts in general. But on the other hand they declare
(p. x) that they will banish “psychological” considerations from their study—though one might have thought that the
“making of a concept” is very much a psychological activity. Instead the authors put their historiographical trust in
words. They take the view that a writer who does not use a particular word cannot be supposed to have possessed the
corresponding concept. They admit exceptions; thus they say (p. 207) that Euler recognized the “reverse relationship”
in mirror-image symmetry though he had no term for it. But their general position is explicit. Using the word “actor”
for any participant in their story, they assert (p. 31) that “one must find symmetry in an actor’s text in order to claim
that this is one of that actor’s categories”.
Of course one sees their point, and applauds it—up to a point. Hon and Goldstein inveigh strongly against the
still-too-common sin of what they call (pp. 29ff) “anachronism”, the practice of wrongly projecting modern ideas into
the minds of our forebears. But I would argue that their demand for explicit textual evidence for a concept is deeply
unrealistic as a matter of common experience and deeply limiting as a strategy for grasping intellectual history. The
first five editions of The Origin of Species do not contain the word “evolution”; must we infer that Darwin lacked
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which is one of those phenomena that one can often “see” very easily, in both senses of the word, with the eye and
with the mind, without (perhaps) the need, or the desire, or the capacity, for verbal description. Hon and Goldstein
want to rule out of the historical record what they call (p. 127) the “perceptual mode of symmetry”, namely human
beings’ direct visual apprehension of bilateral and of rotational symmetry. They criticize (p. 8) John Ruskin and Ernst
Mach—an odd couple, on the face of it!—for having apparently believed that symmetry is a concept without a history
because of their view that this “perceptual mode” is innate. Hon and Goldstein’s own attitude to that last question
remains regrettably unclear. At the very outset of their book (p. vii) they ask whether “the ancients” perceived the
“symmetrical elements” that we see, and they reply that “the answer is negative”, whereas later (p. 8) they concede
that Ruskin and Mach’s assumption of an “innate faculty” may be right after all. But in any case they propose (p. 9) to
exclude from their narrative all reference to the psychology of perception. This decision, and their general insistence
on verbal evidence, ensures that their book is in its main thrust a chronicle of the meanings and uses of words.
Their argument for the sidelining of “perceptual modes of symmetry” kicks off a substantial introductory section
intended to pave the way for the historical survey which follows. Next up is a discussion whose goal is to “clarify
philosophical issues involved in symmetry as a scientific concept”. Two conclusions seem to be stressed. Drawing on
Hermann Weyl’s classic book [Weyl, 1952], Hon and Goldstein affirm (p. 15) that “the modern concept of symmetry
must be formulated in group theoretic terms”. This sounds promising; but the surrounding exposition suggests that the
authors’ grasp of the relevant mathematics is—shall we say—a bit tenuous. Although on page 14 they quote from Weyl
the phrase “the [ . . . ] transformations form a group” (my italics), they go on to say, just one page later, that “Symmetry
is a property of objects or elements that form a group, and, to form this group, there must be a transformation [sic] with
an invariance”. Unhappily, so basic a misunderstanding seems likely to cripple a reader’s confidence in anything else
that the authors say in this sphere. The other philosophical conclusion reached here is that (p. 26) symmetry is unique
among scientific concepts in having both ontological and (via the structure of arguments) epistemological bearing.
The next subsection offers a review of previous histories of symmetry. Hon and Goldstein are not ungenerous
toward their predecessors, but they find two persistent faults. One (pp. 29ff) is the “anachronism” that I have already
mentioned, the wrong ascription of later views to earlier thinkers. The second criticism of existing accounts recalls
the authors’ demand for explicit textual evidence of possession of a concept. They deplore (pp. 34ff) earlier scholars’
willingness to believe, from psychological plausibility, that an historical figure possessed and used a concept which he
or she did not articulate. In their minds these two failings are linked: “by using the false technique of implicit reading”
an unwary historian will “open the gates to a flood” of fatal anachronisms (p. 37).
The book’s long introductory section concludes with a quite detailed outline of the historical account which will
occupy the remainder. Here in particular the authors offer a first delineation of their central thesis, that Legendre
“revolutionized the concept of symmetry” (p. 49) through a dramatic definition in his Éléments de géométrie (1794).
They announce that they will follow subsequent events only to 1815, leaving later developments to other pens.
Their splendid survey—which, as I said, is essentially a history of the meanings of words—begins with the Greek
summetria, which signified “proportionality”. In the ancient and early-modern history of this word and of its trans-
lations Hon and Goldstein identify two strands, which they label respectively “mathematical” and “aesthetic”. The
mathematical use is straightforward. The locus classicus in Greece is Euclid’s Elements, where (X, Def. 1) summetria
connotes, in exact accordance with the meanings of its two components, “co-measure”, commensurability of geomet-
ric magnitudes. The Latin translation commensurabiles was coined by Boethius, and passed with unchanged meaning
down the centuries, ultimately fading from use.
The “aesthetic” thread in the history of summetria presents a much more tangled tale. In ancient Greece the word
signified proper proportions, as for example in Plato’s assertion [Timaeus 87c] that to be both good and beauti-
ful a creature must be “well-proportioned” (Cornford’s translation of summetron [Cornford, 1987]). The canonical
statement of this connotation is by Vitruvius (De architectura, 1st century B.C.). According to Vitruvius symmetry
(symmetria) is obtained when the parts of some object are in “appropriate agreement” (conveniens consensus) with
the whole. The tradition thus established had (say Hon and Goldstein) a very long run, down to the Renaissance.
Then Leon Battista Alberti (1485) shifted attention, in the context of architecture, from the parts-whole relation to the
practice of contriving that elements on either side of a central feature “answer each other” [responderent], wrongly
crediting the idea already to Vitruvius. Thus two meanings of “symmetry” became current, namely “proportion” and
“correspondence”. In 1673 Claude Perrault separated these, laying it down that the correct meaning was “proportion”
in Vitruvius but “correspondence” in contemporary usage (p. 153)—the latter being the more useful concept in monu-
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for architecture in which opposite sides of a central feature are like (pareils) one another, but Hon and Goldstein are
at pains to insist (p. 155) that this is not yet “bilateral symmetry” in its full modern sense, which (they urge) connotes
“mirror” imaging that reverses left and right. Such are the highlights of a long development of which my précis here
is the merest sketch. The chapter describing the Italian and French developments is the longest in the book, and for
my money one of the best. The authors’ command of the sources seems total, and their scholarship is superb.
They turn next to occurrences of “symmetry” in the giants of the Scientific Revolution, who—they insist—do not
deal in modern connotations. For example they cite (p. 158) Copernicus’s familiar complaint—a powerful motivation
for him—that previous astronomers, cobbling together models of the solar system without the unifying benefit of
heliocentricity, were like someone trying to assemble a human figure from random parts and producing “a monster
rather than a man”. These predecessors failed, says Copernicus, to “deduce the design of the universe and the true
symmetry [symmetriam] of its parts”. Hon and Goldstein assign this declaration to the legacy of Vitruvius, in which,
as we saw, “symmetry” meant the proper proportions of parts in a whole. They go on to find several uses of the term
in Galileo, and these too they place—convincingly, in my opinion—in the Vitruvian tradition. Commentators have
pictured Kepler as invoking symmetry in his study of snowflakes, but in fact (say the authors) he uses neither the term
nor the concept.
Passing to the 18th century, the tireless authors find “symmetry” in Linnaeus, for whom it signifies (in plants) the
arrangement of parts in a whole for the purpose of reproduction; here again the ultimate source is Vitruvius. In the
developing science of crystallography symmetry is characterized, naturally enough, in geometric terms, for example
by Jean-Baptiste Louis de Romé de L’Isle (1783) and by René-Just Haüy (1790s). Hon and Goldstein report (p. 191)
that Haüy gives no definition of “symmetry”—he “invokes the term casually, as if the concept is well understood”.
I quote this ostensibly unremarkable statement because it will bear on my criticism (below) of the authors’ main thesis,
that one aspect of the work of Legendre was revolutionary.
In these surveys of early-modern science, as in their chapter on Renaissance architecture, Hon and Goldstein have
touched many more bases than a cursory summary can even suggest. I pass with regret over those rich and informative
pages, for I want instead to respond in detail to the discussion of Legendre which constitutes their book’s principal
thesis. Their final prelude to that thesis is a chapter linking the great names of Euler and of Kant as having (they
say) failed where Legendre would succeed, in investigations of three-dimensional mirror-image symmetry. In 1750
a correspondent asked Euler which of the two possible representations of the constellations—from inside and from
outside the celestial sphere, respectively—is to be preferred. Euler’s reply addressed the question as posed but did not
try to generalize. For his part Kant (1768) sought to wring from various examples—human hands, snails, screws—an
intrinsic distinction of “left” from “right”. But (say Hon and Goldstein, p. 218) this quest was for Kant merely a means
to an end, namely an attempt to discern an absolute directionality of space, and when this ultimately failed the great
philosopher abandoned his studies of symmetry without realizing their significance.
And so the authors come at last, more than two-thirds of the way through their book, to the bold and original
claim that forms its climax. They now set out in full detail their argument that Legendre, the “hero” of their saga,
gave a “definition” of “symmetry” which was at once a drastic break with the past and a seminal influence on the
future. Earlier sections have already tossed out a series of teasers, describing Legendre’s move variously as “radical”
(p. vii), “revolutionary” (p. ix), “far-reaching” (p. 62), “pathbreaking” (p. 64), and, headiest of all, a breakthrough
that “changed our perception and understanding of the world” (p. 50). That kind of build-up can drive a reader’s
anticipation sky-high.
Or perhaps the most tempting first reaction is to fall back on one of the trendy locutions of our time: “Who knew?”
I am aware of no hint of this extraordinary achievement in any earlier exposition where it might seem relevant. To
cite just two much-consulted accounts, the article on Legendre in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography [Itard, 1981]
does not even mention symmetry, and Hermann Weyl’s mathematically authoritative book on symmetry does not even
mention Legendre. If Hon and Goldstein are on solid ground then a lot of rewrite desks will have to swing into early
action.
But are they on solid ground? To put the matter more strikingly: have all previous expositors of Legendre managed
to miss an achievement of huge significance? For my part I have serious doubts. Let us look at the textual evidence.
In the Éléments de géométrie Legendre states and proves the theorem (V, 23) that
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angles are equal will be equally inclined to one another.
There follows a scholium [Legendre, 1817, 155; quoted and translated by Hon and Goldstein on their p. 233], that
is the key text for their claim that Legendre here wrought a revolution. About the coincidence of two solid angles,
Legendre says:
This coincidence, however, only takes place, on the supposition that the equal plane angles are arranged in the same way
for both solid angles; for if the equal plane angles were arranged in the inverse order . . . the two solid angles would be
equal in all their constituent parts without however it being possible to superpose one on the other. This kind of equality
which is neither absolute nor of superposition is worthy of being distinguished by a special expression: we will call it
equality by symmetry [égalité par symmétrie].
In Note I of the Éléments [Legendre, 1817, 276–277; p. 236 of the present work] Legendre rephrases this slightly:
he points out that in earlier books on solid geometry certain proofs “that depend on the coincidence of figures are not
correct” because they fail to take into account the fact that “two solids, two solid angles, two spherical triangles or
polygons may be equal in all their constituent parts without, nevertheless, coinciding by superposition”, and therefore
We have [ . . . ] thought it necessary to give a special name to this equality that does not entail coincidence; we have called
it equality by symmetry; and the figures to which it applies we call symmetrical figures.
Now Hon and Goldstein stake their entire argument on the view that in these passages Legendre is giving a defini-
tion of “symmetry”. But my own reservations begin right there—with the stubborn fact that that is not what Legendre
says he is doing. His words leap off the page: he is actually defining “a new kind of equality”. His underlying strategy
is surely clear, because it is so familiar in mathematics: he will find it possible, and fruitful, to identify, through a
notion of pseudo-“equality”, things which are nearly alike but not quite—here, two equal-angled but nonsuperposable
solids—if their similarities are useful, or their differences inessential, for the investigation in hand. One of the texts
quoted above sets out the sphere of relevance and application of the definition: the different ordering of the two sets
of angles.
But what then of symmetry, the heart of the authors’ case that this passage is revolutionary? Legendre needed a
label for his new version of equality, and—I would argue—“symmetry” provided an obvious choice. Symmetry is
manifestly present in the relationship of the two solids, and (on my interpretation) Legendre took that for granted,
and further took for granted that his readers could “see” it too. We recall that the crystallographer Haüy did exactly
the same thing, at almost exactly the same time, in his context. Much later in the Éléments [Legendre, 1817, 305;
pp. 247–248 of the present volume] Legendre points out that one can “get a very correct idea of the set-up” in such
cases by picturing the two solids as mirror images, but clearly this gloss is intended only as an aid to the struggling.
Hon and Goldstein may well be right to credit Legendre with the first explicit use of “symmetry” in this context of
reverse ordering, but if the symmetrical character of the solids’ relationship was by now a matter of general recognition
then the magnitude of Legendre’s innovation would seem much reduced.
At the end of their book the authors devote a five-page “coda” to the question of why Legendre adopted the term
“symmetry” in this—to them—supremely important definition. They concede (p. 295) that he gives no reason, and
they lament that no suggestion that they can offer inspires confidence. To my mind their strangest remark about Legen-
dre’s possible motivation is their assertion, much earlier (p. 62), that he “sought a term for a new reciprocal relation in
three dimensions without any aesthetic sense, and chose to adopt a term that had already been used in mathematics for
a relation” (my italics). (The last clause recalls the Greek meaning of summetria as commensurability.) In ascribing
to Legendre a wish to avoid aesthetic associations Hon and Goldstein, scrupulous scholars though they are, make a
claim for which there is no shred of textual support—and no psychological plausibility either. Actually the claim is
strange twice over—for of course symmetry does have aesthetic resonance. I suspect that if we could ask Legendre
whether he thought so, he would say “Yes, of course—in the arts; but I was doing mathematics”. In any case, if I am
right that the term’s relevance in this context was a matter of general agreement, then the need to seek motives for its
use disappears.
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Goldstein themselves, seem to support the interpretation that I am suggesting. Thus Lacroix wrote in 1798 that (p. 251)
Legendre, to whom one owes the remark and the clarification of the difficulty which is presented by the equality of inverse
trihedral angles, names them symmetrical, because he considers them as constructed on different sides of the same plane.
Lacroix considered the idea “ingenious”, but his tone is hardly that of someone contemplating a change in “our percep-
tion and understanding of the world”, and his explanation of Legendre’s terminology presents it as perfectly natural.
Similarly an obituary of Legendre by Jean-Frédéric-Théodore Maurice (p. 223) says merely that “he considered, for
the first time, equality by symmetry”—another case (note the flatness of the verb “considered”) of the rhetoric of
“revolution” under firm control.
I conclude that the use of “symmetry” in Legendre’s new sense of “equality” does not warrant Hon and Goldstein’s
picture of a radical break with the past; on the contrary, I argue, that use presumes an established communal under-
standing. But what of our authors’ perhaps more dramatic claim, of that definition’s enormous impact on the future?
Can we join them in seeing Legendre’s move (p. 2) as “revolutionary in its implications for scientific advances after
1794”? To answer these questions we must of course see what claims are made for it. Here I should perhaps stress
that I shall take for granted the usefulness of Legendre’s definition within geometry—surely no one doubts that. The
crucial issue is the wider reverberations.
Hon and Goldstein actually cast Legendre’s supposed legacy in, so to say, several different lights. One of these
seems at first sight impressive and important. Legendre, we are told (p. 241), “has recast symmetry in terms of an
abstract mathematical relation”—which does sound (however vaguely) like the wave of the group-theoretic future.
This characterization is said to follow from the fact that the two solids in his definition of “equality by symmetry”
need not be viewed as parts of a single object—their symmetrical relationship is independent of their relative positions
in space. In my opinion this grabs the wrong end of the stick: that the two solids need not be spatially related is
unimportant, but that they can be viewed as mirror images is the key to Legendre’s ingenious idea and appropriate
terminology. But let us see what consequences follow from this move by Legendre toward “abstraction”. So far as
I can tell, Hon and Goldstein never do spell out its significance for the future; instead they gloss their use of the term—
in a way that ends by astonishing. They quote at length D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie article on geometry, written of
course for a lay audience, which explains that mathematicians deal in abstractions from, idealizations of, the physical
world. Legendre, they go on to say (p. 242), “worked in this framework”: he applied his new concept of symmetry
only within geometry, not to natural or to man-made objects. Thus his supposed breakthrough consisted in doing this
piece of his mathematics in precisely the way that everybody had done mathematics since antiquity—such at least is
my reading of the authors’ conclusion here. But perhaps I am missing something.
Another formulation of Legendre’s achievement and influence, which indeed the authors say (p. 48) is their “prin-
cipal claim” for him, may also raise some readers’ eyebrows. “Legendre’s definition of symmetry”, they say, “is
unprecedented: the concept is defined as a relation, not as a property”. I read this statement with a double sense of
surprise. As the stuff of “revolution” it seems pretty tame; but, more to the point, surely it is not even true—have
the authors not told us that in antiquity “symmetry” meant (in mathematics) commensurability, a relation between
two magnitudes? The importance of this distinction between property and relation is a recurrent theme of the book,
but at the risk of seeming terminally obtuse I have to confess that, try as I may, I cannot see the point of it. Cannot
the bilateral symmetry of the human body be viewed under either light—as a property of the whole or as a relation
between the two sides? But however that may be, the supposed importance of Legendre’s viewing symmetry as a
relation turns out to sit uneasily with the authors’ other (and seemingly much more significant) proclamation of his
legacy, namely that (p. 2) his definition “marks the watershed in the history of the scientific concept of symmetry”.
As I reported earlier, Hon and Goldstein take this concept to be characterized by the application of group theory—and
they urge repeatedly (pp. 2, 51, 59, 65), that there the distinction between property and relation is unimportant. Given
that denouement, the assigning of lasting value to Legendre’s stance would seem a tough sell.
So perhaps his “far-reaching” influence on the future lay in another direction entirely. The authors say (pp. 48–49)
that his “definition” appears “revolutionary” in the light of the facts that (i) in its immediate wake “symmetry” was
used in “a variety of scientific domains”, and (ii) in each of these a definition of symmetry was given. They offer a
number of examples, including the work of Monge on naval engineering (1788), Biot on analytic geometry (1802),
astronomy (1805), and optics (1806), Poinsot on statics (1803), and more. Setting aside the fact that Monge’s work
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influence on the others? I can detect none. Legendre’s definition, as we saw, bears on three-dimensional mirror-image
symmetry, whereas in all the cases just cited the symmetries are two-dimensional and therefore much simpler. But
perhaps Legendre was an example, an inspiration? No hint of that is cited by the authors—no text that they quote
mentions Legendre. In the end they are reduced (p. 299) to the “conjecture [!] that Legendre’s usage may [!] have
made it easier for others to invoke symmetry in scientific contexts”. The bold pronouncement of “pathbreaking”
impact on the future seems here rather muted.
Indeed if we ask where, in fact, the likes of Monge, Biot, and Poinsot got their impulse to invoke symmetry in their
respective investigations the answer seems clear—and it has nothing at all to do with Legendre. Hon and Goldstein
themselves provide the clue. They say of Biot (p. 275) that in discussing elliptical orbits he “introduced the term,
symmetry, without explanation, expecting the reader to be acquainted with this usage”—precisely, it turns out, as all
his colleagues did, each in his own domain. In other words they proceeded exactly as I have argued that Legendre
proceeded in the definition of which the authors make so much. Viewing matters in this light has the magical effect of
banishing at one stroke several apparent puzzles over which Hon and Goldstein furrow their brows (pp. 60–62, 292):
that (i) despite their earlier claim that definitions of symmetry proliferated immediately after Legendre, people were in
fact “reluctant” to give such definitions; (ii) nobody seems to have tried to compare the definitions at work in different
contexts; and (iii) although these mathematicians knew one another, history records no “personal exchanges” about
symmetry among them. It seems to me that motivations for all these activities disappear if we merely suppose that
each of the scientists cited by Hon and Goldstein saw symmetry in the configuration he was studying, took it as wholly
unproblematic, and exploited it accordingly. Surely symmetry was for these people just a means to an end, used at
informal, intuitive levels that cared nothing for the history and nuances of words—and needed not the example set by
Legendre. The authors carry out for each of them an elaborate textual analysis, valuable in its own right; but perhaps
their obsession with words and their explicit banning of psychological considerations costs them some perspective.
Thus (p. 267) they reproduce from Pierre Bouguer’s 1746 treatise on naval architecture a schematic horizontal section
of a ship, visibly symmetric about a central line from bow to stern, and they comment that
The figure is striking, for we can immediately discern the bilaterally symmetrical arrangement of the two sides of the
figure. But Bouguer, as noted, did not invoke the term, symmetry. Hence, the usage of symmetry in its bilateral sense
cannot be ascribed to Bouguer.
To this one wants to respond, “No doubt; and no doubt the issue is important; but in the last analysis he just looked at
the diagram and saw what he needed to see”.
One further aspect of Hon and Goldstein’s discussion of the aftermath of Legendre’s “definition” adds perhaps an
element of poignancy to their story. They expound (pp. 286ff) Lacroix’s definition (1797) of “symmetric functions”
(functions symétriques) as one more piece of evidence that applications of symmetry took off after Legendre. They
quote (p. 287) Lacroix’s assertion that a symmetric function remains invariant under permutation of its roots— appar-
ently without realizing that here they stand on the edge of the group-theoretic treatment of symmetry that elsewhere
looms so large for them. The hero’s mantle that they reserve for Legendre would fit Lacroix much better.
If I am right in some of these reservations about their main thesis then Hon and Goldstein may wish to tinker
accordingly should their book enjoy a second edition. And given that opportunity the publisher would do well to try
to rectify some failings of another kind, blemishes in the nitty-gritty aspects of book-making. The authors’ prose, to
start with that, is generally competent, but it never soars to the sky, and sometimes it bogs down badly in the mud.
The sentences on Bouguer which I quoted two paragraphs back can serve as a prime example; for another, take the
passage (p. 9) in which the authors say, “The reason that motivates this exclusion concerns our belief . . . ” where they
could have said, “We make this exclusion because we believe . . . ”. At such places one fears that Springer’s editors
must simply have nodded off. The book is well organized, and each chapter ends with a very useful “Conclusion”
(which however would be better called a “Summary”). Unfortunately this has the consequence that most themes are
discussed in at least three places (the long introductory section, the relevant chapter, and that chapter’s “Conclusion”),
and often a reader who wants the authors’ full view of a particular issue must piece together fragments from all of these
sources. This multiplicity also means that the text can seem very repetitive—key points seem to be made over and
over again. An extreme case of repetition occurs on page 153, where an entire paragraph resurfaces almost verbatim
after already gracing page 54. The scattering of discussions of a given topic makes more regrettable the fact that the
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“Legendre, influence of” and “Symmetry, modern scientific concept of” are central among the authors’ concerns, the
index provides no steer to either. Perhaps less pardonable than any of these flaws are editorial lapses—some careless,
some apparently stemming from ignorance. Two consecutive lines on page 296 exhibit respectively the non-use and
the correct use of the convention for distinguishing in print between a word and the thing which the word signifies.
Commas are missing at points where they should appear, and (more commonly) present where they should not be. In
this last respect one sin stands out: the book’s theme ensures that the construction “the term, symmetry, . . . ” appears
very often, and eventually those unnecessary commas exasperate. Amusingly, several occurrences of the construction
drop the commas—and somehow the sky never falls.
A final judgment on this worthy, curious volume must balance two sharply contrasting perspectives: substantial
virtues on the one hand, grave weaknesses on the other. I want to stress a third time that facts, ideas, people—giants
of the stature of Archimedes, Newton, Leibniz, Montesquieu, Diderot, and more—crowd these pages in a profusion
to which I have here done painfully scant justice. I believe, for reasons that I have tried to convey, that the authors’
cherished core thesis—that Legendre gave a new “definition” of symmetry which had a “revolutionary” impact on later
thought—is profoundly mistaken. But I also believe that, flaws notwithstanding, much in the authors’ tale, especially
its earlier chapters, will remain of great value, a lasting contribution to our understanding of the history of a concept
(or rather, a word!) as elusive as it is important.
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